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Abstract: Epistemic conservatism maintains that some beliefs are immediately 
justified simply because they are believed. The intuitive implausibility of this claim 
sets the burden of proof against it. Some epistemic conservatives have sought to 
lessen this burden by limiting its scope, but I show that they cannot remove it 
entirely. The only hope for epistemic conservativism is to appeal to its theoretical 
fruit. However, such a defense is undercut by the introduction of phenomenal 
conservatism, which accomplishes the same work from a more intuitive starting 
point. Thus, if one opts for conservatism, better to choose the phenomenal kind. 
 
Foundationalists agree that no belief can be justified unless some belief is immediately 
justified. Disagreement, however, surrounds the source of immediate justification. Epistemic 
conservatism says that immediate justification for our basic beliefs arises simply from the 
possession of those beliefs in and of themselves. The bare state of having a belief gives one some 
presumption in its favor. This is to be contrasted with other views, including other forms of 
conservatism, in which immediate justification arises from experience. For instance, phenomenal 
conservatism says (roughly) that basic beliefs are justified because they seem true (Huemer 
2001, Ch. 5). Thus, it is an experiential state called a “seeming” or “appearance” that lends the 
belief some presumption in its favor.1 In light of these other forms of conservatism, epistemic 
conservatism is perhaps better titled “doxastic conservatism,” although I will continue to use the 
traditional moniker for continuity. 
 Epistemic conservatism, in one form or other, boasts a surprisingly impressive list of 
adherents, including (arguably) Thomas Reid, Roderick Chisholm, William Lycan, and Richard 
Swinburne. Though its popularity in the contemporary landscape has waned in light of well-
known criticisms (e.g., Foley 1983; Christensen 1994), recent work shows epistemic 
conservatism to be more plausible and resilient than it is usually given credit for (McCain 2008, 
2019, forthcoming; Poston 2012, 2014). In particular, epistemic conservatism promises to do 
serious theoretical work if admitted. 
 This paper offers a critique of epistemic conservatism. The objections are not directed at 
the conservatism, but at the claim that the conservative presumption derives simply from the 
possession of a belief in and of itself. Phenomenal conservatism, I will argue, proves to be the 
better form of conservatism. It provides all the theoretical benefits of epistemic conservatism 
while avoiding its drawbacks. Accordingly, epistemic conservatives should consider joining with 
their phenomenal cousins. 
 
§1. Epistemic Conservatism 
Before voicing our critique, it is first necessary that we understand precisely what we are 
critiquing. There are many different principles that march under the banner of epistemic 
conservatism, some of which do not concern immediate justification at all. These include forms 
of what Hamid Vahid calls “differential” and “perseverance conservatism” (Vahid 2004). For 
instance, Lawrence Sklar’s differential conservatism maintains only that, when faced with an 
equally good alternative hypothesis, one is justified in continuing to believe a previously held 
hypothesis if that belief was initially formed “on the basis of whatever positive warrant may 
accrue to it from the evidence, a priori plausibility, and so forth” (Sklar 1975, p. 378). These 
forms of conservatism “are concerned with the justificatory status of a belief after its conception 
and acquiring positive epistemic value” (Vahid 2004, p. 113). Prominent proponents of 
differential and perseverance conservatism, respectively, include W.V.O. Quine (Quine and 
Ullian 1978) and Gilbert Harman (1986). Despite their pedigree, such principles do not bear on 
the immediate justification of basic beliefs, and so do not fall within our purview. 
Conservative principles that do pertain to immediate justification are forms of what 
Vahid calls “generation conservatism” (Vahid 2004). Unrestricted versions extend the same 
initial presumption to all beliefs, whereas restricted versions grant it only to some. For instance, 
Chisholm endorses a fairly unrestricted form of epistemic conservatism: “Anything we find 
ourselves believing may be said to have some presumption in its favor—provided it is not 
explicitly contradicted by the set of other things we believe” (Chisholm 1980, pp. 551-552). 
Whereas Swinburne restricts his principle of credulity to basic beliefs: “every proposition that a 
subject believes or is inclined to believe has (in so far as it is basic) in his noetic structure a 
probability corresponding to the strength of the belief or semi-belief or inclination to believe” 
(Swinburne 2001, p. 141). Finally, Reid grants immediate justification to all and only natural 
beliefs—i.e., those formed by the proper functioning of our natural constitutions (McAllister 
2016). Formulations can also differ with respect to the exact status bestowed on beliefs, as these 
examples illustrate, as well as the conditions for its maintenance and defeat. 
On this final point, some versions of generation conservatism, such as Chisholm’s, claim 
only that belief grants the agent some “presumption in its favor” (see also Lycan 1988). 
Chisholm explicitly defines this to mean, “Accepting h is more reasonable for S than accepting 
not-h” (Chisholm 1977, p. 8). As McCain points out, presumption thus defined does not imply 
that the belief is justified, even in the absence of defeaters (McCain 2019, pp. 203-204). Indeed, 
these weak versions of epistemic conservatism are often favored by coherentists who deny 
immediate justification altogether. Instead, the presumption in favor of our beliefs is leveraged 
into justification only by being incorporated into a coherent and mutually supporting framework 
of such beliefs. These weaker versions of epistemic conservatism can bypass some of the 
objections faced by their stronger brethren (McCain 2019), but they do so at the cost of 
theoretical potential. Most of the theoretical benefits claimed by epistemic conservatism require 
that it explain immediate justification. In any case, the general criticism I offer will apply to 
these weaker principles as well (although I will continue to use the language of justification). 
The point is that whatever work can be done by epistemic conservatism can be done by 
phenomenal conservatism with less cost. 
Among the stronger versions of epistemic conservatism, the most plausible formulation 
comes from Kevin McCain (2008, p. 186): 
 
EC If S believes that p and p is not incoherent, then S is justified in retaining 
the belief that p and S remains justified in believing that p so long as p is 
not defeated for S. 
 
Notice that EC does not say that beliefs are reasons for themselves (c.f. Adler 1996). McCain 
clarifies that, on EC, believing p bolsters one’s justification for p, but not by providing a reason 
for p (McCain 2008, p. 187). The idea behind EC, and epistemic conservatism more generally, is 
that our beliefs can sometimes be justified without any reason for believing them at all. 
 Because of this claim, it is generally conceded that epistemic conservatism is not 
especially intuitive. Indeed, I think it is fair to say that it is positively counterintuitive by most 
lights. The main complaint (expressed as a question) is: Why should the mere fact that I believe 
something even if I have no adequate reason for doing so justify me in continuing to believing 
it? As Sklar puts it, “surely not only is believing p not sufficient grounds for believing p…; in 
general, believing p is no grounds at all for believing p” (Sklar 1971, p. 377). This is made 
especially salient by considering that, “A person may happen to hold a belief because of whim, 
prejudice, emotional manipulation, specious arguments, self-interested rationalization, 
subliminal advertising, drugs, or post-hypnotic suggestion” (Goldstick 1971, p. 187). I will 
unpack these intuitions in a moment, but first it is worth asking why anyone would endorse such 
a principle.  
 
2. Theoretical Motivations for Epistemic Conservatism 
Usually, people tolerate EC and principles like it because it is theoretically fruitful. Some 
of the uses ascribed to it are suspect (Vahid 2004, pp. 99-101), but others appear genuine. 
Among these, the most significant advantages claimed for epistemic conservatism are that it 
helps us make sense of (i) common sense philosophical methodologies, (ii) the justification of 
belief in the external world despite underdetermination by the evidence, (iii) the justification of 
memory beliefs, and (iv) cases of forgotten evidence. Another, oft-cited advantage of epistemic 
conservatism is that it helps account for our conservatism in belief-revision, but this seems more 
a matter of differential or perseverance conservatism rather than generational. 
 The introduction of phenomenal conservatism severely undercuts these motivations. The 
seminal formulation of phenomenal conservatism comes from Huemer (2007, p. 30): 
 
PC If it seems to S that p, then, in the absence of defeaters, S thereby has at 
least some degree of justification for believing that p. 
 
On phenomenal conservatism, immediate justification arises not from the beliefs themselves but 
from the apparently revelatory experiences on which they are based. Most of the things epistemic 
conservatism promises to explain can be accommodated as well or better by its phenomenal 
cognate. As Vahid says, “With such a view in place, there would be no need to appeal to 
doxastic conservatism” (Vahid, n.d.). Add to this that phenomenal conservatism is significantly 
more intuitive. Thus, if there is need to posit one of these two principles to secure the 
aforementioned advantages, then phenomenal conservatism seems the better choice. As a result, 
the motivation for epistemic conservatism is lacking from the get-go. To shore up my critique, 
let us quickly run through some of the areas where epistemic conservatism is supposed to help 
and see how phenomenal conservatism handles them. Remember, given the greater intrinsic 
plausibility of phenomenal conservatism, I only need to show that it explains things as well as 
epistemic conservatism (not better than it). 
 
2.1 Common Sense Methodology 
A common sense philosophical methodology is sometimes summarized: Start with the 
obvious, and never give up the more obvious for the less. This approach has two components to 
it. First, “The metaphilosophy of common sense,” Stephen Boulter writes, “insists that common 
sense beliefs are to be treated as default positions. … one has shifted the burden of proof onto the 
shoulders of those who would reject common sense beliefs” (Boulter 2007, p. 24). Second, this 
presumption is taken to be quite formidable, generally warranting the rejection of philosophical 
theories or arguments when they come into conflict with common sense beliefs. This is 
sometimes true even if their exact error remains unknown. Reid writes: 
 
Zeno endeavoured to demonstrate the impossibility of motion; Hobbes, that there was no 
difference between right and wrong; and [Hume], that no credit is to be given to our 
senses, to memory, or even to demonstration. Such philosophy is justly ridiculous, even 
to those who cannot detect the fallacy of it. It can have no other tendency, than to shew 
the acuteness of the sophist, at the expence of disgracing reason and human nature, and 
making mankind Yahoos. (Reid [1764] 1997, p. 21) 
 
The rejection of philosophical theories in this way has been called “the GE Moore Shift” (Rowe 
1979) because of its use by GE Moore (e.g. Moore 1959, p. 41), although Reid almost certainly 
served as Moore’s inspiration. While it is controversial how much weight is to be given our 
common sense beliefs, the fact that they are given some presumption—that they serve as our 
starting points in philosophical theorizing—is ubiquitous. 
 Going back to ancient times, Aristotle recommends that we begin with the endoxa—often 
translated as “reputable,” “received,” or “credible” beliefs or opinions—and seek to preserve as 
many of them as possible. He writes: 
 
As in our other discussions, we must first set out the way things appear to people, and 
then, having gone through the puzzles, proceed to prove the received opinions about 
these ways of being affected—at best, all of them, or, failing that, most, and the most 
authoritative. For if the problems are resolved, and received opinions remain, we shall 
have offered sufficient proof. (Aristotle 2004, 1145b2–7) 
 
This same mentality pervades contemporary philosophy as well. Boulter attributes it to 
philosophers such as Ryle, Austin, Grice, and Searle (Boulter 2007, pp. 24-25). It arguably 
underlies Rawls’s method of reaching reflective equilibrium (Rawls 1971). David Lewis directs 
us to, “Collect all the platitudes you can think of” and use these as our starting point (Lewis 
1972, p. 256). James Pryor recommends, “[W]e start with what it seems intuitively natural to say 
about perception, and we retain that natural view until we find objections that require us to 
abandon it” (Pryor 2000, p. 538). 
 Epistemic conservatism accounts for such methodologies by granting presumption to 
one’s beliefs simply because they exist; but clearly, this is not our only option. The reason 
common sense beliefs are so common is because they seem true—often so strongly that we 
would consider them evident or obvious. Either that or they are the natural conclusions of things 
that are obvious. Notice that for Aristotle, the endoxa are reputable attempts to account for the 
phainomena, or appearances, which are experiences similar to seemings.2 Thus, we can account 
for the presumption given to such beliefs by appealing to a principle like phenomenal 
conservatism on which seemings constitute reasons to believe their content. Indeed, phenomenal 
conservatism does a better job than epistemic conservatism in fitting with these methodologies. 
For it is not all beliefs that are used as starting points but only the ones that seem obvious (“the 
platitudes”), or the ones that are “intuitively natural to say,” or the ones credibly formed in 
response to the appearances. 
 
 
2.2 Response to Skepticism 
Another way in which epistemic conservatism is supposed to help is by furnishing a 
response to skepticism, specifically skepticism stemming from underdetermination by the 
evidence. This form of skepticism is most prominently connected to Descartes but goes back at 
least as far as the epistemological debates between the Stoics and the Academic Skeptics. The 
worry is that all of one’s evidence for, say, the existence of some tree is logically compatible 
with the falsity of that hypothesis. For instance, one’s experience of the tree might be produced 
by an Evil Deceiver. But if that evidence does not eliminate all of the alternatives, then, it is 
argued, one cannot justifiably believe in the tree on that basis. Epistemic conservatism provides a 
way out by granting belief in the tree immediate justification, despite uneliminated skeptical 
possibilities, simply because this belief is held. Phenomenal conservatism does the same by 
granting immediate justification to what seems to be the case (Huemer 2001, Ch. 8). It is 
apparent to us that there is tree (which is why we believe it in the first place), and so we are 
immediately justified in believing in that tree on the basis of that experience. The crucial point is 
that phenomenal conservatism’s response to skepticism is just as good or better than that of 
epistemic conservatism. 
Luca Morretti has recently argued that the phenomenal conservative response to 
skepticism isn’t all it’s made out to be (Moretti 2018, 2020; McCain and Moretti forthcoming). 
The problem of reflective awareness, as Moretti calls it, is that “seeming-based justification is 
elusive, in the sense that S’s becoming reflectively aware of her seeming that P and wondering 
about its possible causes results in either just destroying S’s seeming-based justification for 
believing P or replacing this non-inferential justification with inferential justification” (Moretti 
2018, p. 267). For example, if I reflect on my perceptual seeming of a tree and inquire as to its 
origins, there will be multiple explanations available—some on which the content of my seeming 
is true (veridical explanations) and others on which it is false (deceptive explanations). If I 
cannot independently verify that some veridical explanation is correct, then I thereby acquire a 
defeater for the initial justification provided by my tree-seeming. On the other hand, if I can 
independently verify the veridical explanation, then I have inferential justification for the tree’s 
existence which supplants any immediate justification provided by the tree-seeming. 
I have several worries with this reasoning, but I will confine myself here to just one. The 
argument assumes that the presumption granted to seemings is nullified simply by raising the 
uneliminated possibility that the seeming is deceptive. (Uneliminated, that is, by some 
independent source of justification. They might be eliminated by one’s justification for the tree-
belief itself in the style of G.E. Moore, who used “Here is one hand, and here is another” to rule 
out skeptical alternatives to an external world (Moore 1939).) But a presumption is no 
presumption at all which can be overturned simply by raising the possibility of error. A 
prosecuting attorney, for instance, cannot overcome the presumption of innocence simply by 
raising the possibility that the defendant is guilty. The whole point of presumed innocence is 
that, if the evidence is compatible with both the defendant’s innocence and guilt, then the verdict 
must be “not-guilty.” The presumption in favor of seemings works in a similar way. Absent 
evidence for the seeming’s deceptiveness or unreliability, one should respond to them as 
veridical, in which case one’s immediate justification stands undefeated. As Huemer said in his 
original defense of phenomenal conservatism, “You would not let the mere possibility that P is 
true suffice for you to accept it, so why let the mere possibility that P is false suffice for you not 
to accept it?” (Huemer 2001, p. 105). 
That being said, as a general rule, the more we come to know about the world, the more 
the absence of evidence for reliability indicates the absence of reliability. Thus, Moretti is correct 
that a more comprehensive worldview verifying the reliability of one’s initial seemings will need 
to be built up if justification is going to be sustained long-term. It is also the case that such 
verification will inevitably be, in a procedural sense, circular, with the reliability of seemings 
being verified on the basis of other seemings. But such circularity is benign (not to mention 
unavoidable (Alston 1991, Ch. 3-4)) because the initial justification of one’s beliefs does not 
depend on the support provided by one’s larger belief system but is granted immediately on the 
basis of their apparent truth. Thus, Moretti is correct that the phenomenal conservative response 
to skepticism is not as simple as it is sometimes made out to be, but this does not render it 
altogether ineffective. 
Perhaps the problem Moretti raises is more serious than I acknowledge. No matter. If 
phenomenal conservatism fails to provide a compelling response to skepticism for these reasons, 
then so does epistemic conservatism. The problem of reflective awareness applies equally to 
both. That is, if one reflects on the origins of one’s beliefs, one will recognize veridical and 
deceptive explanations. Either one cannot independently verify the veridical explanation, in 
which case one’s immediate justification is defeated, or one can verify it, in which case one’s 
immediate justification is replaced. Thus, even if the full force of the problem of reflective 
awareness is granted, it provides no point of separation between the two forms of conservatism. 
 
2.3 Memorial Beliefs and Forgotten Evidence 
The justification of memorial beliefs and cases of forgotten evidence are other areas 
where epistemic conservatism is supposed to help (McCain 2008, p. 188). On epistemic 
conservatism, one’s belief that, say, one did or did not eat breakfast this morning is justified not 
on the basis of any evidence for that claim, but simply because one holds that belief (and it 
remains undefeated). Furthermore, in cases where we no longer remember the original 
justification for our beliefs, those beliefs remain justified simply by virtue of the fact that one 
continues to hold them (so long as they remain undefeated). 
Now, I am not convinced that this approach is the best way of handling such cases. It is 
not clear to me why, in both cases, one’s beliefs cannot continue to be justified on the basis of 
the original evidence one had for forming those beliefs, despite the fact that those evidential 
states no longer exist or have been forgotten. After all, their causal effects linger in the form of 
one’s current beliefs, and that may be sufficient to say that those beliefs are still based on, and 
thus justified by, that original evidence. Assessing this further would take us too far afield. All 
we need to see for our purposes is that if this approach is correct, phenomenal conservatism can 
account for it just as well as epistemic conservatism can.  
One’s memorial beliefs can be justified on the basis of memorial seemings: for instance, 
it seems to you that you did or did not eat breakfast this morning. McCain denies that memorial 
beliefs are “justified by any kind of sense perception or distinctive memory experience” (McCain 
2008, p. 118), but one can easily deny McCain’s denial. It is true that many memories (semantic 
memories, in particular) aren’t based on any state with sensory phenomenology, but that is 
compatible with those memories being based on experiential states in which the remembered 
content is presented as accurately representing what occurred in the past. Such memorial 
seemings, like rational intuitions, needn’t have any sensory phenomenology. And such 
experiences do in fact seem to serve as the bases for many or most of our memorial beliefs. 
Likewise, a belief can remained justified even when one has forgotten one’s original evidence 
for it so long as that belief seems true, even if it only seems true because of the evidence one 
previously had for it. In short, phenomenal conservatism can account for such cases in a way that 
mirrors epistemic conservatism. 
 None of this should be particularly surprising. Both principles are forms of conservatism, 
and so share similar approaches and, in turn, advantages. I obviously haven’t surveyed every 
advantage claimed for epistemic conservatism, but it is fair to expect that most of them will be 
accommodated just as well by phenomenal conservatism. Even if a few are not, the net effect is 
still to greatly dilute the overall motivations for epistemic conservatism. To make matters worse 
(or better, depending on which camp you’re in), phenomenal conservatism also avoids the most 
serious problem facing epistemic conservatism. We will dissect this problem in the next section 
and see how phenomenal conservatism does better. 
 
§3. Epistemic Conservatism’s Fatal Flaw 
 Let us return to the intuitive complaint above. Many have generated counterexamples 
attempting to capture this complaint. Richard Feldman makes the following contribution: 
 
Detective Jones has definitively narrowed down the suspects in a crime to two 
individuals, Lefty and Righty. There are good reasons to think that Lefty did it, but there 
are equally good reasons to think that Righty did it. There is conclusive reason to think 
that no one other than Lefty or Righty did it. (Feldman 2002, p. 144) 
 
If Jones randomly believes Lefty did it, then it seems that principles like EC would grant 
justification to Jones’s belief, simply because that is the belief that he holds. But clearly Jones’s 
belief would not be justified in such circumstances; rather, he should withhold assent. 
 The most plausible versions of epistemic conservatism try to escape such examples by 
narrowing their scope. In the case of EC, this is accomplished by McCain’s explication of the 
conditions of defeat. On McCain’s view, defeat can occur in either of two cases (McCain 2008, 
p. 186): 
 
DC1 If S has better reasons for believing that ~p than S’s reasons for believing 
that p, then S is no longer justified in believing that p. 
DC2 If S has reasons for believing that ~p which are as good as S’s reasons for 
believing that p and the belief that ~p coheres equally well or better than 
the belief that p does with S’s other beliefs, then S is no longer justified in 
believing that p. 
 
In the Lefty-Righty case, Jones’s reasons for believing that Lefty committed the crime are equal 
to his reasons for believing that not-Lefty (or Righty) did. Moreover, the belief that Righty is 
guilty presumably fits just as well with Jones’s background beliefs as his belief in Lefty’s guilt 
does. Thus, DC2 obtains and the justification for Jones’s belief is defeated, reconciling our 
intuition with EC. 
 McCain avoids the counterintuitive implications by constricting the circumstances to 
which EC applies; however, the problem cannot be avoided forever. Eventually, one must bite 
the bullet—accepting that belief in p can be justified even when the balance of reasons doesn’t 
support it—or else restrict the scope of one’s principle so aggressively that it doesn’t apply to 
anything. 
 To prove this, I will first show that EC does not escape all counterintuitive implications. 
Consider a scenario designed to avoid triggering either of McCain’s conditions of defeat. In this 
scenario, S’s reasons for p and ~p are of equal strength, but belief that p coheres better with S’s 
other beliefs than belief that ~p. For instance, envision a situation in which S has strong 
experiential reasons for ~p but S’s background beliefs cohere better with p, balancing S’s 
reasons for p and ~p against one another. To put a face on it, imagine one intuits that murdering 
a drifter and harvesting his organs is always wrong (~p); however, one’s background beliefs 
cohere slightly better with consequentialism and the conclusion that, in some cases, murdering 
the drifter is morally permissible (p). Here EC maintains that, if S happens to believe that 
murdering the drifter is sometimes permissible, that belief is justified in accordance with EC. 
However, the intuition of Feldman and others seems to apply in this case just as strongly as in 
the Lefty-Righty case. If the reasons really are equally strong on both sides, then the only 
justifiable stance is to withhold assent. 
To add to the problem, imagine a second person S* phenomenally indistinguishable from 
S except that, following his or her intuition, S* believes that murdering the drifter is always 
wrong. Here DC2 would obtain—the belief that the drifter’s murder is sometimes permissible 
coheres better with S’s other beliefs than does belief that his murder is always wrong—and so 
S*’s immediate justification for believing that this is always wrong would be defeated. But why 
the asymmetry? In both cases, S and S* believe something when there are equal reasons on both 
sides. In the one case, these reasons come from one’s background beliefs and, in the other, they 
come immediately from experience, but why should that make any difference? 
As a last resort, one could argue that the proposed scenario is impossible—that S’s 
reasons for p will always be superior to the reasons for ~p when p coheres better with S’s 
background beliefs. If this is true, it is presumably because coherence with background beliefs is 
one’s exclusive source of reasons. Thus, this strategy requires doing away with experiential 
evidence altogether (a daunting prospect) and adopting a coherentist approach to non-inferential 
justification.3 Regardless, it would have the effect of eliminating the problematic cases. If S’s 
reasons for p and ~p are equal, this is because both p and ~p cohere equally well with S’s 
background evidence, in which case DC2 obtains and S’s justification for p is defeated. 
As before, this avoids the counterintuitive implications only by narrowing the conditions 
in which EC provides immediate justification. Indeed, it narrows them so much that they become 
almost non-existent. Consider four possible scenarios in which S believes p, which are together 
exhaustive: 
 
(i) S believes p and S’s reasons for p are better than S’s reasons for ~p. 
(ii) S believes p and S’s reasons for p are equal to S’s reasons for ~p. 
(iii) S believes p and S’s reasons for p are worse than S’s reasons for ~p. 
(iv) S believes p and S has no reasons for p or ~p at all. 
 
If (iii) obtains, then so does DC1 and S’s immediate justification for p is defeated. If (ii) obtains, 
then so does DC2 and S’s immediate justification for p is defeated. If (i) obtains, then S retains 
justification for believing p; but S’s belief is also mediately justified by the stronger reasons for p 
present in S’s larger belief system. This inferential justification essentially replaces the 
immediate justification granted by EC, rendering it irrelevant. Thus, the only scenario in which 
the immediate justification from EC shows itself is the extreme one in which S has no reasons 
for or against p at all, including no framework of background beliefs that bears on the issue. This 
is called being in a state of “empty symmetrical evidence” (Poston 2014, p. 21), and it seems 
clear that no human ever actually finds herself in it (Coren 2021). It is fair to say that this would 
be a much more limited role for epistemic conservatism than its proponents originally 
envisioned. 
Yet the most plausible form of epistemic conservatism, defended by Ted Poston (2014, 
Ch. 2), limits itself to beliefs of exactly this sort. Poston’s version of epistemic conservatism is 
restricted to “mere beliefs,” which are defined as those accepted in a state empty symmetrical 
evidence. It states: 
 
EC* If S merely believes p, then S has some justification for maintaining her 
belief that p. 
 
Poston describes EC* as a principle of last resort, since it is only relevant in those situations in 
which reasons tell us nothing. This does not, however, make it inconsequential. Poston follows 
Wittgenstein (1969) in arguing that hinge propositions are accepted in the state of empty 
symmetrical evidence (Poston 2014, Ch. 2). Hinge propositions are fundamental assumptions 
“upon which the door of inquiry turns,” and so must already be in place before the provision of 
considerations for or against any them can even begin to occur. They include things like the 
reliability of our cognitive faculties, the uniformity of nature, and the stability of meaning over 
time. The presumption in favor of such beliefs provides just enough leverage to get inquiry off 
the ground, at which point Poston favors an explanatory coherentist account of justification. 
 Though extremely restrictive, Poston’s EC* is plausible. It escapes counterexamples of 
the sort given above, and it is less counterintuitive to grant presumption to such bedrock 
assumptions if only because they are believed. Indeed, Poston asks us what alternative we really 
have? (Poston 2014, pp. 39-41) If we find ourselves in the state of mere belief, we cannot wait 
for various arguments to weigh in since the proffering of considerations for or against such 
assumptions will itself presuppose them. Whatever path we take—believing, disbelieving, or 
withholding assent—will be selected in the dark. Since we already find ourselves believing, it 
makes the most sense just to continue in that direction. 
 There is another option here. It may be true that hinge propositions cannot be supported 
by derivative reasons (such as those provided by deductive, inductive, or explanatory inferences) 
without relying on those very propositions, but what about non-derivative reasons? It is possible 
that the justification of hinge propositions comes not from the fact that they are believed but 
from the fact that they are utterly evident—the sort of things that seem so obviously true that it is 
ridiculous to deny them. In which case those seemings might themselves constitute reasons for 
believing—non-derivative reasons not depending on any arguments or framework of background 
beliefs. We thus return to my central theme: anything epistemic conservatism can do, 
phenomenal conservatism can do just as well (and from a more plausible starting point). 
 What’s more, reflecting on the evident character of hinge propositions should lead us to 
reconsider the plausibility of EC*. It turns out that EC* must grant justification to hinge 
propositions even if they do not seem the least bit true. Why? Because if one concedes that 
believing in hinge propositions is justified only when they appear true, then one must also 
concede that those seemings are acting as non-derivative reasons, in which case one is not in the 
state of empty symmetrical evidence. Thus, to properly evaluate EC*, we must try to envision a 
situation in which those hinge propositions are not evident—a difficult prospect, as such 
propositions are so naturally apparent to us that it is hard to imagine feeling indifferent towards 
them. Nevertheless, we shall try. 
Imagine an epistemological Adam of sorts—an adult human brought into the world fully-
formed. Our Adam has the conceptual framework necessary to form thoughts, but has no 
indication whatsoever as to how the world works. He hears a sound. The question comes to mind 
whether there must be some cause of this sound. Again, our Adam has no background beliefs 
that bear on this claim. Moreover, the proposition does not in any way strike him as being true. 
Or even plausible. As far as its apparent truth is concerned, he feels completely indifferent 
towards it. It feels no different than if he were considering any random proposition—say, that in 
2073 the Royals will win the World Series. The one difference is that he finds himself assenting 
to the former claim. He, for no reason at all, believes that the sound has a cause. Is Adam’s belief 
justified? I submit that it is not.4 
 If the proposition is not believed because of its apparent truth, then why is it affirmed? 
The answer seems to be that the belief is, from the agent’s perspective, brutely caused, having no 
basis whatsoever.5 From the subject’s perspective, how could belief in such conditions be 
anything other than completely arbitrary? One way of gauging justification is asking whether it 
makes sense for someone solely concerned with securing true beliefs and avoiding false ones to 
risk assent. Well, if there are no reasons counting in favor of a belief, and it doesn’t even seem 
true in the slightest, then that belief doesn’t appear a risk worth taking. Perhaps if the pursuit of 
truth were all that mattered then belief might be wagered, but the goal of avoiding falsehood 
prohibits reckless doxastic ventures, which is precisely what belief in these conditions would be. 
In such an instance, Locke seems more or less right in saying, 
 
He that believes without having any Reason for believing, may be in love with his own 
Fancies; but neither seeks Truth as he ought, no pays the Obedience due to his Maker, 
who would have him use those discerning Faculties he has given him, to keep him out of 
Mistake and Errour. (Locke [1689] 1975, pp. 687-688)     
 
 This objection is at the core of the intuitive complaint with which we began. There has to 
be some indication a proposition is true before it can be affirmed in a way that isn’t reckless with 
respect to the avoidance of falsehood. There has to be some on balance reason for belief. And 
epistemic conservatism says that belief can be justified even if there is no reason at all. This is 
the unavoidable problem plaguing all forms of epistemic conservatism and, in my judgment, a 
decisive one. 
 Granted, the epistemic conservative might have an out if there was no alternative; but 
there is. Phenomenal conservatism provides a decidedly more plausible option. For on this view, 
the claim is that Adam is justified in believing that the sound has a cause because that 
proposition seems obviously true to him. Belief seems a sensible response to such obviousness 
for those concerned with finding the truth and avoiding falsehood. That’s a wager worth making. 
At the very least, this is a much more plausible starting point than on epistemic conservatism. 
Thus, phenomenal conservatism not only serves the same purposes as epistemic conservatism, it 
does so from a more intuitive foundation. 
 
§4. Reid’s Defense 
 In my judgment, the strongest defense that can be offered for epistemic conservatism 
comes from early modern philosopher Thomas Reid. These arguments are largely neglected in 
contemporary debates surrounding epistemic conservatism, to their loss. Alas, these too are 
undermined by the introduction of phenomenal conservatism. That is, they work just as well or 
better as arguments for phenomenal conservatism than for epistemic conservatism, as we shall 
see.6 
Reid’s first argument appeals to the irresistibility of certain beliefs (belief in hinge 
propositions being prime candidates). These are beliefs that cannot be changed by any human 
effort, either direct or indirect. Regarding such, Reid writes “An invincible Error of the 
Understanding, of Memory, of Judgment or of Reasoning is not imputable for this very Reason 
that it is invincible” (Reid 2002, p. 66). The idea is that we cannot be at fault for something we 
do not control (ought implies can), and so if we do not have power to resist forming a belief, that 
belief is ipso facto permissible for us (McAllister 2016). Reid’s reasoning makes sense if our 
notion of epistemic responsibility required voluntary control over our beliefs, for it is true that 
we have no control over many of our beliefs in this sense. But contemporary accounts of 
epistemic responsibility do not require voluntary control, doxastic voluntarism being largely 
maligned. Moreover, we do retain a more moderate form of control over the relevant beliefs in 
that they result from cognitive dispositions that are our own, and it is possible for us to be 
otherwise disposed.7 In this sense we can resist even “irresistible” beliefs, and we should. If the 
irresistible belief is not occasioned by some reason to believe in its truth, then our previous 
complaint returns: in the complete absence of reasons, believing isn’t justified. 
 Reid’s second argument appeals to the naturalness of certain beliefs (again, belief in 
hinge propositions being prime candidates). Natural beliefs are those formed in accordance with 
innate principles of our constitutions. The fact that there is nothing we did to bring about these 
beliefs is thought to shield us from any responsibility pertaining to them (McAllister 2016). Reid 
offers the plea, “This belief, Sir, is none of my manufacture; it came from the mint of nature; it 
bears her image and superscription; and, if it is not right, the fault is not mine” (Reid [1764] 
1997, p. 169). But the fact that a belief results from our natural constitution is no guarantee that 
it’s justified, even initially, for we might be naturally constituted in a deficient way. Cognitive 
scientists regularly expose how natural it is for us to engage in motivated reasoning and all other 
sorts of problematic cognition. 
My critique here treats naturalness as a descriptive concept—natural beliefs being 
something like those that all humans will form in the statistically normal course of human 
development, barring some developmental obstacle. It is obvious that belief in hinge propositions 
is natural in this sense, but that counts little in its favor. What if Reid is using naturalness as a 
normative concept—natural beliefs being those that result from a properly-constituted human 
intellect? That counts a lot in their favor, but there is no non-question begging reason to think 
that brute belief in hinge propositions is natural in this sense. To the contrary, I have made the 
case that if the belief is formed without any indication of its truth, then that belief is not one that 
the properly-constituted human intellect would form. 
Despite these deficiencies, there remains something extraordinarily insightful about 
Reid’s defenses. Consider the possibility of cognitive dispositions so fundamental to the human 
intellect that, if removed, one would cease to operate as an intellectual agent at all. Let us call 
these “constitutive principles of rationality.”8 The beliefs formed in accordance with such 
constitutive principles would be irresistible in the most formidable sense. They could be avoided 
only by divesting oneself of one’s intellectual agency altogether. The fact that one cannot resist 
beliefs in this sense does seem to shield us from criticism on their basis. Moreover, such beliefs 
are guaranteed to be natural in the normative sense. We know that the dispositions producing 
them are parts of the properly-constituted human intellect because they are parts of any 
functioning human intellect. If a belief resulted from this kind of principle, it would surely be 
justified. 
This is, I think, the strongest case that could be made for EC*. If the very process of 
having and giving reasons requires belief in hinge propositions, then the disposition to believe 
them is a constitutive principle of rationality and we cannot be faulted for believing them. 
Furthermore, there is a plausible case to be made that belief in hinge propositions is in fact 
required in order to make inferences or engage in other forms of discursive reasoning. This does 
not, however, make it a constitutive principle of rationality to believe in hinge propositions 
without any indication of their truth. That is not required for rational activity. For it may be that 
such hinge propositions can be justifiably believed on the basis of seemings, as already 
discussed.  
Indeed, if we are looking for constitutive principles of rationality, the following seems to 
be our most plausible candidate: not that beliefs must be given presumption whenever we hold 
them, but that beliefs must be given presumption whenever they seem true. Starting from this 
more plausible point, the case might still be made that trusting in how things seem is constitutive 
of rational activity in that no rational activity would be possible without it. For what else could 
constitute reasons for believing hinge propositions but seemings? How could we even get started 
in reasoning, much less make any progress, if we did not place a basic trust in how things 
seemed to us? A full defense of phenomenal conservatism as a constitutive principle of 
rationality must await another forum.9 The point at hand is that phenomenal conservatism once 
again undercuts motivation for its doxastic counterpart. 
 
§5. Conclusion 
 The long and the short of it is this: epistemic conservatism starts from an implausible 
claim—that certain basic beliefs are justified simply because they are believed. This places the 
burden of proof against it. Some epistemic conservatives have sought to avoid this burden by 
limiting its scope, but I have argued that they cannot escape it entirely. When it comes down to 
it, epistemic conservatism posits basic beliefs justified without any good reasons for accepting 
them, and that’s a significant cost to the position. Epistemic conservatives have proposed that we 
pay this cost in exchange for the theoretical fruit yielded by their position. However, such a 
defense is undercut by the introduction of phenomenal conservatism, which accomplishes much 
the same work from a much more plausible starting point. Thus, if one opts for conservatism, 
better to choose the phenomenal kind.10 
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1 Some have suggested that seemings just are beliefs, in which case phenomenal conservatism 
simply collapses back into epistemic conservatism. This is perhaps why proponents of 
phenomenal conservatism almost exclusively endorse the view that seemings are experiences 
rather than beliefs or inclinations to believe. For a survey of such debates and a defense of the 
experiential view, see McAllister 2018. 
2 See Shields 2013 on Aristotle’s conservatism. 
3 For this reason, McCain himself presumably would not opt for this solution, as he allows for 
experiential evidence (McCain and Moretti forthcoming). 
4 Coren 2021 argues that it is practically impossible to evaluate such bare beliefs since we do not 
ever encounter them in our actual circumstances. While I am sympathetic to the concern, this 
reasoning does not, in my judgment, establish that evaluating bare beliefs is impossible; only that 
it is exceedingly difficult. If we are careful, we might still elicit lessons from imagining a subject 
in these extreme theoretical conditions. 
5 It’s not clear that this is possible. How could a belief be sustained if it neither seemed true nor 
had any other conscious psychological motivation? Even McCain says, “I am dubious about 
whether we do in fact form beliefs for which we have no reasons (even bad ones)” (McCain 
2008, p. 198, ft. 33). 
6 Reid’s relationship to phenomenal conservatism, or dogmatism, is somewhat complicated. 
Boesplflug 2019b is correct that Reid was not a phenomenal conservative, nevertheless 
phenomenal conservatives often claim him as their forefather. This is because Reid’s 
epistemology contains several core insights that some believe are most plausibly captured in 
phenomenal conservatism. What are these core insights? Reid’s common sense philosophical 
methodology is certainly one, as Boespflug 2019a argues. Perhaps the most important, however, 
is Reid’s apprehension that the fundamental orientation of rationality is one of credulity rather 
 
than suspicion—that all rational inquiry proceeds on trust, or faith, in one’s rational faculties and 
what they purportedly reveal to be true. I discuss this in McAllister 2019 and at greater length in 
McAllister n.d. 
7 See Boyle 2009 on exercising intrinsic control over our beliefs rather than agential control. 
8 Rysiew 2002 interprets Reid as claiming that the principles of common sense are constitutive 
principles of rationality. 
9 I articulate such a defense in McAllister n.d. 
10 I’d like to thank an anonymous reviewer for his or her exceedingly thorough and helpful 
comments. 
